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NOTE
PURCHASER'S DUTY TO DISCLOSE UNDER SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION RULE X-10B-5
In recent years, there have been a number of cases involving
non-disclosure of inside information by purchasers when buying
corporate securities. The purpose of this Note is to delineate the
nature and extent of the affirmative duty to disclose imposed on
securities buyers under SEC Rule X-10B-5.1 No attempt is made
to deal with the further problems of disclosure by sellers tinder the
Rule.
Prior to 1933, the Federal Government had no power over cor-
porate securities frauds,2 except by enforcement of the fraud section
of the federal postal laws.3 The Securities Act of 1933 included
§ 17(a) 4 which was designed to preclude fraud by any person sell-
ing securities. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act of 1934' gave the
SEC power to make rules protecting investors from manipulative
or deceptive devices in security transactions. Pursuant to this
authority the SEC announced Rule X-10B-5 forbidding fraudulent
practices by any person in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security This rule was apparently designed to fill the gap be-
tween § 17(a) which concerns the use of fraud by any person in the
sale of securities and § 15(c) (1) of the Exchange Act of 19341
which covers fraud by a broker-dealer in the sale or purchase of
securities other than on a national security exchange. Althoughp
1. 17 C. F R. § 240.10b-5 (1949) "It shall be unlawful for any per-
son by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to dafraud.
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not nis-
leading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, inl con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security."
2. See Loss, Securities Regulation 806 (1951) For a brief historical
background to the Securities Act of 1933 see McCormick, Understanding the
Securities Act and the S.E.C. 3-17 (1948)
3. 18 U. S. C. § 1341 (1952)
4. -48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 77 q (a) (1952).
5. 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 78 j (b) (1952) "It shall be un-
lawful for any person by the use of any means or instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce or by the mails
(b) To use in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or not so regis-
tered, any manipulative or deceptive device in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest "
6. 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended 15 U. S. C. § 78 o (c) (1) (1952).
7 See Securities and Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
DISCLOSURE UNDER RULE X-1OB-5
Rule X-10B-5 overlaps § 17(a) and § 15(c) (1) and rules there-
under," it alone covers fraud in purchases by persons other than
broker-dealers.
While the Rule is concerned with "fraudulent practices," it is
not limited to cases in which all the elements of comnmon-law fraud
are present.9 One of the most significant effects of the Rule has been
its modification of common-law standards of fraud by making un-
lawful the non-disclosure of material facts by a buyer of corporate
securities. Typically this problem arises where a buyer purchases
securities without disclosing inside financial information not avail-
able to the seller which would indicate that the securities are worth
more than the asking price.
DISCLOSURE AT ComioN LAW
Traditionally no action for misrepresentation would lie at com-
mon law for mere non-disclosure.10 Nevertheless, in order to miti-
gate the harshness of this rule, the courts have developed a number
of exceptions. If a person makes any disclosure, he has a duty to
say enough so that his words will not be misleading." Also, there
is a duty to disclose if a fiduciary relationship can be found."
Although an officer or director occupies a fiduciary relation to
the corporation and to the stockholders collectively,"3 a majority
of courts have traditionally held that a director owes no fiduciary
duty to an individual stockholder. 1 4 Therefore, failure to disclose to
an individual stockholder inside information which has a bearing on
the stock's value would not militate against the buyer so long as lie
did not actively mislead or misrepresent. However, a minority of
jurisdictions, in order to implement disclosure, hold that a fiduciary
relationship does exist between a director and individual stock-
holders and that the latter must accordingly be informed of all
8. The Commission generally brings action against broker-dealers un-
der § 15 (c) and § 10 (b). See e.g., R. D. Bayly & Co., 19 S. E. C. 773
(1945). Since § 15 (c) deals specifically with broker-dealers, their transac-
tions are more profitably considered under that section and will not be
covered by this Note.
9. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F Supp. 808, 831 (D. Del. 1951)
(dictum).
10. Prosser, Torts 7- (1941).
11. Id. at 723.
12. Ibid.
13. 3 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 838
(1947 Replacement Volume).
14. E.g., Seitz v. Frey, 152 Minn. 170, 188 N. AV 6 (1922) ; Connolly
v. Shannon, 105 N. J. Eq. 155, 147 At. 234 (Ch. 1929) aff'd. wilthou opmnion,
107 N. J. Eq. 180, 151 Atl. 905 (Ct. Err. & App. 1930). See Note, 14 Minn.
-L. Rev. 530 (1930).
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relevant facts concerning the affairs of the corporation.'0 The tradi-
tional view is slowly being broken down by an intermediate doctrine
asserted by the United States Supreme Court in Strong v. Rapidc. 0
That case, which has been widely followed,'1 7 ruled that even if the
relationship between an officer or director and a stockholder is not
of such a nature to require general disclosure, there are instances
where, because of "special facts," a duty to disclose exists. This
special facts doctrine has been broadened by some courts to such an
extent that there is little distinction between it and the minority
rule.' In some other jurisdictions, however, the traditional view
still has considerable influence on judicial thinking 9 and X-10B-5
will then provide a more effective remedy 20
PERSONS COVERED BY THE RULE
Section 10(b) forbids deceptive practices by "any person" in
the purchase of securities. Although "person" is broadly defined in
§ 3 (a) (9) of the Exchange Act,21 it is doubtful whether the court
would require all persons acquiring inside information to make full
disclosure before purchasing. But certainly any director, officer,
controlling stockholder,'22 or the corporation itself would come with-
in the statute's provision. There is, however, some question of the
applicability of Rule X-10B-5 to persons not actually managing the
corporation but who, nevertheless, have access to inside information.
15. E.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S. E. 232 (1903). For a
favorable exposition of the fiduciary rule see Berle, Publicity of Accounts
and Directors' Purchases of Stock, 25 Mich. L. Rev. 827 (1927)
16. 213 U. S. 419 (1909).
17 E.g., Agatucci v. Corradi, 327 Ill. App. 153, 63 N. E. 2d 630 (1945)
18. See Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich. 504, 508-509; 202 N. W 955, 956
(1925), Stevens, Corporations 696 (2d ed. 1949)
19. See Geller v. Transamerica Corp. 53 F Supp. 625 (D. Del. 1943)
petition to review denied. 63 F Supp. 248 (D. Del. 1945), aff'd without
opinion, 151 F 2d 534 (1945).
20. In one case the court, following the traditional rule, granted de-
fendant's motion for a summary judgment on the common law count but held
that the complaint did state a claim upon which relief could be granted Under
Rule X-10B-5. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 71 F Supp. 457 (D. Del.
1947). In a later opinion on the merits the court reinstated the common law
count. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F Supp. 808, 828 (D. Del. 1951) It
seems that the court, to do this, had to broaden its interpretation of the
traditional common law rule as to whether concealment of relevant data can
constitute misrepresentation. Compare the reasoning in the Speed case, 99
F Supp. 808, 828 (D. Del. 1951), with Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 63 F
Supp. 248, 251 (D. Del. 1945).
21. 48 Stat. 883 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 78 c (a) (g) (1952) " [Pier-
son means an individual, a corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-
stock company, a business trust, or an unincorporated organization."
22. Any person or corporation who controls the policies of a corpora-
tion, even though not a majority stockholder, would be a controlling person.
Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1947) (dictum),
Note, 59 Yale L. J. 1120, 1144 (1950).
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Broker-dealers acting in collusion with an insider cannot purchase
for themselves2 3 or for the insider2 4 without full disclosure, nor can
a person who learns inside information while doing business with
a corporation. -5 It would also seem that employees who have con-
fidential information,26 as well as persons exercising great influence
over corporate policy even though not officers or directors,=- should,
for disclosure purposes, be considered insiders. And since protection
given to shareholders by X-10B-5 would be largely illusory if an
officer or director could channel his information through a member
of his immediate family,28 disclosure rules should extend at least
this far. Moreover, since the duty of disclosure runs to the stock-
holder, the lack of a "fiduciary relationship" with the corporation
should not allow a person who confederates with an officer or direc-
tor to escape liability under X-10B-5.
PURCHASES BY A CORPORATION OF ITS OWN SECURITIES
Rule X-10B-5 has been used by the SEC with particular effec-
tiveness in forcing a corporation to disclose financial information
when purchasing its own securities.2 0 One can readily see that there
is as great an opportunity to defraud a seller by non-disclosure when
corporations purchase as when insiders purchase. If a company,
guilty of not disclosing pertinent financial information, buys back its
common stock at an undervalued price,30 the remaining stock-
holders benefit as definitely by their increased equity in the cor-
poration as if they had purchased themselves. Preferred shares on
which dividends have not been paid and arrearages have accumu-
lated, often sell at a fraction of their book value because the im-
proved financial position of the company has not been disclosed.31
23. M. S. Wien & Co., 23 S. E. C. 735, 746 (1946).
24. Fry v. Schumaker, 83 F Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1947), M. S. Wien
& Co., supra note 23.
25. Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S. E. C. 373 (1943).
26. But cf. Stout v. Cunningham, 33 Idaho 464, 196 Pac. 208 (1921).
27. See Slavm v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F 2d 799 (3d Cir.
1949).-
28. In re Calton Crescent, Inc., 173 F 2d 944, 950-51 (2d Cir. 1949)(dictum), aff'd sub non., Manufacturer's Trust Co. v. Becker, 338 U. S.
304 (1949) , see Note, 39 Calif. L. Rev. 429, 435 (1951).
29. There is some common law authority that absent special circum-
stances no fiduciary relationship exists between a director purchasing for the
corporation and an individual stockholder and therefore there is no duty to
disclose. Gladstone v. Murray Co., 314 Mass. 584, 50 N. E. 2d 958 (1943).
Contra: Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 348 Ill. App. 134,
108 N. E. 2d 493 (1952) (When directors act for the corporation they occupy
a position of trustee for each individual stockholder and must disclose all
material facts).
30. See Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S. E. C. 373 (1946).
31. See SEC v. Boyd Transfer & Storage Co., Civil No. 1548, D. Mimi..
Dec. 5, 1945, S.E.C. Litigation Release No. 295, 308.
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If the corporation purchases without disclosing the information, the
common stockholders are benefited because preferential claims are
removed at an unusually low price.32 Similarly, if preferred shares
are subject to call, but have conversion privileges, 83 or debentures
are selling at a large discount, 4 disclosure should be required before
the corporation purchases, lest the common stockholders be unduly
benefited at the expense of the selling security holders.
By § 3 (a) (13) of the Exchange Act3" the term "purchase" in-
cludes any contract to buy or otherunse acquire. The Commission
has, therefore, brought injunction proceedings" to prevent a cor-
poration from benefiting from its improved financial condition by
offering to exchange less valuable stock of another company for its
own preferred shares. 37 And where a corporation, pursuant to a
merger, gave the stockholders an option to exchange common stock
in the old company for either common or preferred stock in the
new company, the SEC required the company to disclose disparity
of value between the old common and the new preferred. 8 More-
over, it would seem that under the terms of § 3(a) (13) of the
Exchange Act, X-10B-5 would cover cases where insiders do not
disclose material facts to shareholders before the latter vote to
merge, consolidate, or reorganize and thereby exchange old sectirl-
ties of a high value for securities of a lesser value in the new com-
pany 
39
It has been argued that an officer might, under some circum-
stances, have a legitimate duty to better the financial structure of a
corporation by purchasing for the corporation, without full dis-
closure, debt securities at as low a price as possible.40 However, any
strengthening of the corporation is done for the benefit of the
32. Ibid.
33. See Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F 2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947).
34. See SEC v. Greenfield, E. D. Pa., Civil No. 5361, April 2, 1946,
S.E.C. Litigation Release No. 302, 333.
35. 48 Stat. 884 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 78 c (a) (13) (1952).
36. See note 67 infra and text thereto.
37 See SEC v. Oils and Industries, Inc., S. D. N. Y., Civil No. 27-450,
April 4, 1945, S.E.C. Litigation Release No. 224.
38. SEC v. Standard Oil Co. of Kansas, S. D. Tex., Civil No. 2552, Feb.
26, 1947, Litigation Release 388.
39. Originally the SEC, in relation to registration of securities issued
during reorganization, ruled that any exchange of stock pursuant to a merger,
reorganization, or consolidation was not a "sale" under § 5 of the Securities
Act. Loss, op. cit. mpra note 2, at 335. It might be argued that corresponding-
ly, exchanges pursuant to mergers are not "sales" or "purchases" and thereby
excluded from X-10B-5 regulation. However, the Commission has ruled that
the "no sale" theory does not apply to the fraud provisions of the Exchange
Act. Securities and Exchange Act Release No. 3420 (1951). The courts will
probably agree.
40. Gladstone v. Murray Co., 314 Mass. 584, 50 N. E. 2d 958 (1943)
Note, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 769, 777-778 (1946)
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stockholders at the expense of the seller. Thus a director's duty to
the corporation should not outveigh a more important duty to re-
frain from taking unfair advantage of a selling security holder."
USE OF INSTRUMENTALITIES OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE
In applying § 10 the courts have held it unnecessary for plaintiff
to allege and prove that fraudulent representations or omissions
were made by use of the mails or other instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce.4 2 Since § 10(b) requires use of interstate instru-
mentalities in conwction with the purchase of securities, it is suffi-
dent if the defendant has used the mails, telephone, or telegraph
at some time during the transaction.43 Furthermore, a defendant
cannot claim that since his business is entirely intrastate § 10(b)
has no application. It has been held that there is nothing in the act
which would limits its application to interstate commerce, so long
as an instrument of interstate commerce is used.44
SECURITIES INCLUDED
Section 10 and Rule X-10B-5 cover all securities, whether or not
registered on a national exchange. No securities are exempted from
the provisions of § 10. Thus the fact that a security qualifies as an
exempted security under the Securities Act of 1933 has no bearing
on the applicability of X-10B-5. 45 Furthermore, "security" is so
inclusively defined in § 3(a) (10) of the Exchange Act' 6 that it
would seem that Rule X-10B-5 covers'all types of security transac-
tions. Even so, some defendants have contended that X-10B-5 does
not apply where the securities in question were neither registered
on a securities exchange nor traded on an over-the-counter mar-
ket.47 They base their argument on § 2, the preamble of the Ex-
change Act,4 8 which states that transactions in securities, as com-
monly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter
markets, are affected with a national public interest and must be
regulated. Therefore, defendants argue, securities which do not
fall within the purview of the preamble are exempt. The courts have
rejected this argument, holding that X-10B-5 includes all securities.
41. See Loss, op. cit .rupra note 2 at 831.
42. Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F. 2d 627, 633 (9th Cir. 1953); Northern
Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954, 961 (N.D. Ii. 1952).
43. Fratt v. Robinson, mipra note 42.
44. Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F Supp. 954,
961 (N.D. IIL 1952).
45. Baron v. Shields, 131 F Supp. 370 (S.D. N.Y. 1954).
46. 48 Stat 883 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 78 c (a) (10) (1952).
47. See e.g., Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F. 2d 627, 628-629 (9th Cir. 1953).
48. 48 Stat. 881, 15 U. S. C. § 78 b (1952).
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The courts base their decision on grounds either that the term
"over-the-counter" in the preamble is broad enough to embrace all
securities not listed on a national exchange,'9 or that, although
"over-the-counter" means transactions concerning brokers and
dealers, the language of § 10(b) and X-10B-5 is not ambiguous and
no additional sections are needed to clarify them.-
SALE BY AN INJURED SHAREHOLDER TO PERSONS
OTHER THAN DEFENDANT
Does X-10B-5 apply to situations where defendant insider with-
holds material information in an offer to buy and plaintiff, on the
basis of this under valued offer, sells to a third party ?" Since the
language of § 10(b) and X-10B-5 makes deceptive practices In
connection zmnth the purchase of securities unlawful, the plaintiff
would almost certainly have a good claim for relief if he acted mu
reliance on the offer price, and was one of the persons intended by
the defendant to be defrauded. But if the plaintiff, in selling to a
third party, relied only on the under-valued market price resulting
from dealings between the non-disclosing defendant and other sell-
ers, rather than relying on defendant's asking price made directly
to him, it is unlikely that X-10B-5 would apply 1 ' In an analogous
case 53 bearing on this problem, plaintiffs alleged that they bought
securities on an exchange at a price inflated by false and misleading
representations and non-disclosures of defendant-insider, and sold
at a price deflated by discovery of these misrepresentations. Defend-
ant previously sold at the overvalued price. The court denied relief
under X-10B-5 since the plaintiff had not alleged reliance on the
false representations, furthermore, according to the court, there
was no semblance of privity " By this the court apparently meant
that the plaintiff could not have bought the same stock sold by the
defendant since thirteen days had elapsed between the last sale by
the defendant and the first purchase by the plaintiff. However this
was an action in the nature of fraud, which action has been held to
49. E.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F Supp. 808, 830 (D. Del.
1951).
50. E.g., Robinson v. Difford, 92 F Supp. 145 (E.D. Pa. 1950) , see also
52 Mich. L. Rev. 893, 896.
51. Defendant-insider, without disclosing inside information orders
from Broker A. Broker A orders from Broker B who purchases from C. See
Note, 59 Yale L. J. 1120,1138 (1950).
52. Director of A Co. learns of uranium find made by the company.
Without disclosing he offers to purchase at market price. Plaintiff B (toes
not learn of director's offer but sells to a third party at current market price.
B brings action against director for damages.
53. Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F Supp. 701
(S.D. N.Y. 1951), aff'd without opmion, 198 F 2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952)
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lie where the plaintiff was induced to deal with a third party by the
false representations of the defendant.5' To require some type of
contractual relation between the parties in X-10B-5 actions would
defeat the words-of the statute and unnecessarily limit the rule.
It has been contended that the court by finding no "semblance
of privity" may have meant that this plaintiff was not one of the
persons the defendant had intended to defraud.Y This interpretation
of the court's decision introduces a common law limitation, cor-
responding to the doctrine of proximate cause, designed to prevent
too great an extension of plaintiff's liability.
Thus it might be reasoned that a plaintiff will have to satisfy at
least two requirements in order to recover under X-10B-5 when
not having sold directly to the defendant. (1) He must have relied
on the implications raised by the defendant's non-disclosure and
(2) he must be a person intended by the defendant to be defrauded. G
Quite probably-a plaintiff selling to a third party, in a suit under
X-10B-5, will have to show material reliance other than just re-
liance on a market price undervalued because of defendant's non-
disclosure. However it is doubtful whether the strict interpretation
of restrictions (2), above, will be read into the Rule. Already there
is evidence that X-10B-5 will extend to persons other than those
intended by the defendant to be defrauded.5 7 Moreover, even if the
transaction is not of the type intended to be induced by the de-
fendant, the courts might well grant relief if the plaintiff has relied
and such reliance was reasonably to be anticipated.58 Since this
latter restriction has to some extent, been liberalized at common
law, 9 it is to be expected that this liberalization will be reflected
in the application of X-10B-5.
WHAT MUST BE DISCLOSED
Theoretical grounds for imposing an affirmative duty to dis-
54. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 10, at 705.
55. Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 198 F 2d 883.
884 (2d Cir. 1952) (dissenting opinion). See Comment, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 308(1952).
56. See note 53 stpra. These limitations were developed as common law
restrictions as to the persons to whom a defendant guilty of false representa-
tion would be liable. -3 Restatement, Torts § 531 (1938) (as limited by§§ 532, 536).
57 In a case involving false representations and non-disclosure in a
registration statement of preferred stock, the court allowed cotmon stock-
holders, who bought co.mmon stock on the market relying on the false regis-
tration statement to bring action under X-10B-5. Fischman v. Raytheon
Mfg. Co., 188 F 2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
58. Defendant-insider, without disclosing material facts, offers to pur-
chase from A at a stated price. A, relying on the offer, sells to B, at this
undervalued price. A sues defendant for damages.
59. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 10, at 731-732.
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close can be found in all three subsections of the rule. Non-disclosure
has been ruled an act or practice which operates as a fraud under
subsection (3),'0 an artifice to defraud under subsection (1),01 and
an implied misrepresentation12 or misleading omission 3 under sub-
section (2)
In practical application the Rule requires an insider to disclose
facts obtained by means of his inside position which would material-
ly affect the judgment of the seller. 4 While this viewpoint in effect
adopts the fiduciary rule,05 it is still necessary to decide whether a
specific fact, if disclosed, would be "material" in influencing the
seller's judgment. Speed v. Transamerica Corp."0 points up a
potential conflict between the courts and the Commission as to
what constitutes "materiality" In that case the majority stock-
holders offered to buy the plaintiff's stock at approximately 33Y3%
above the market value but "neglected" to disclose that the earn-
ings of the company had greatly increased and the market value of
its tobacco inventory had tripled in value. The company was sub-
sequently liquidated, the majority stockholder making a substantial
profit on the shares purchased. The plaintiffs brought action for
damages under X-10B-5.0 7 The court found that before the offer
was made the defendant had decided to liquidate. Thus, the failure
to disclose this plan coupled with a failure to disclose the appreciated
value of the inventory materially affected the seller's judgment.
However, the court indicated that had there been no plan to liqui-
date at the time of the offer, full disclosure would have been un-
necessary "' The court felt that the stock's market price reflected
the increased inventory value and besides, the defendant had offered
substantially more than this market price. If the price offered is
equal to or above the resultant market price had all the facts been
known, disclosure would be immaterial. However, any doubts about
materiality should be resolved against the non-disclosing purchaser
60. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947)
61. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F Supp. 808, 828 (D. Del. 1951).
62. Ibid. It has been reasoned that when an insider makes an offer lie
impliedly represents that the price is, in his judgment, fair. If because of
failure to disclose, the price is undervalued there is an implied imisrepresenta-
tion. See Loss, op cit. supra note 2, at 834.
63. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F Supp. 808, 828 (D. Del. 1951)
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
64. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., supra note 63 at 800-801 (die-
tum) , Speed v. Transamerica Corp., supra note 63 at 828-829 (dictum)
65. See note 15 supra and text thereto.
66. 99 F Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
67 See note 94 infra and text thereto.
68. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F Supp. 808, 825-826 (D. Dcl.
1951) (dictum)
[ Vol. 40:62
DISCLOSURE UNDER RULE X-1OB-S
Thus, had there been no plan to liquidate, the price offered by the
defendant would, according to the court, have been equivalent to or
greater than the market price would have been if all the facts had
been known. This position has dangers because a court must
hypothesize as to how the market would react to complete disclosure,
a risky guess at best
The Commission, appearing as amicus curiae, argued on the
other hand that the increased inventory value would have been
material even in the absence of a plan to liquidate. 9 Since the pur-
pose of X-10B-5 is to equalize the bargaining position of the parties
by encouraging the dissemination of information, the Commission's
view would seem to be the better one. Full disclosure means a price
set by informed bargaining rather than a unilateral determination
by an insider, even though the latter price might be higher than
market value.
Other civil actions by a defrauded seller under X-10B-5 have in-
volved either fraudulent representations 0 or non-disclosure of
special facts71 which in most jurisdictions would presumably create
liability under the common-law doctrines. Thus courts have stated
that a purchaser must disclose secret negotiations for the acquisi-
tion of a business72 or an agreement to sell the corporate assets at
an advantageous price.73
Under the power to enjoin rule violations,7 4 the SEC, alleging
non-disclosure of material facts, has instituted a number of in-
junction proceedings against purchasers under X-10B-5. Most often
these cases concern small companies which are exempt from the
registration requirements of the Securities Act,75 and furthermore
ard not compelled to disclose the financial data required by the
Exchange Act.76 In such instances, the Commission has required
69. Id. at 826 n. 9 (dictum).
70. E.g., Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F 2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Robinson v.
Difford, 92 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
71. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F Supp. 954, 956-957
(N.D. IlL 1952) (dictum).
72. Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., suipro note 71, at
956-957 (dictum).
73. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
74. 48 Stat. 900 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 78 u (e) (1952).
75. For a discussion of the grounds most commonly used by small cor-
porations for exemption of securities from registration under the Securities
Act of 1933 see Lane, Securities and the Small Company, 2 Cleveland-
Marshall L. Rev. 93, 95-99 (1953).
76. Every issuer of a security registered on a national securities ex-
change must file financial reports with the exchange and the SEC pursuant
to § 13(a) of the Exchange Act. Also, companies not registered on an ex-
change but maiking securities issues of substantial size must file reports under§ 15 (d). See Loss, op. cit. supra note 2, at 492-499.
I
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an insider-purchaser to make full disclosure of the financial condi-
tion of the company before buying. The Commission considers as
"material" such facts as sales volume," net earnings per share,"'
book value, 9 and net current assets per share ;8" nor is it suffictent
to state only the net sales of the previous year, if current sales are
up."' In three instances where assets were carried on the books at
cost, the Commission indicated that a vast appreciation of the
market value of the assets must be disclosed, even though the de-
fendants followed normal accounting procedures.8 2
In addition to requiring information concerning the financial
welfare of the corporation, the SEC has compelled purchasers to
disclose additional facts which might influence the seller's judg-
ment such as the market value when the security is traded only
over-the-counter, s8 and the extent and nature of the purchaserIs
holdings in the company's securities.8  Moreover the insider-pur-
chaser cannot take advantage of his knowledge of such special cir-
cumstances as current negotiations to sell the stock at a higher
price, 5 or that the company will be profitably liquidated " or re-
organized. 7 In most of the injunction proceedings initiated by the
SEC a number of material facts have been undisclosed. This is not
surprising since these factors tend to be inter-related, however, it
seems that non-disclosure of any one of the material facts listed Iw
the Commission as a basis for injunction would be sufficient for
action if it points to an insider's attempt to profit improperlv at
the seller's expense.
77 See SEC v. Cohen, E. D. Pa., Civil No. 5461, Dec. 11, 1945, l.itiga-
tion Release No. 311.
78. See e.g., SEC v. Boyd Transfer & Storage Co., Civil No. 1548, D.
Minn., Dec. 5, 1945, SEC Litigation Release No. 295, 308, SEC v. Mueller,
E. D. Wis., Civil No. 2022, April 20, 1945, Litigation Release No. 264, 268.
79. See e.g., SEC v. Mitchell, N. D. Ohio, Civil No. 23097 Aug. 6.
1945, Litigation Release No. 288, 291.
80. See e.g., SEC v. Boyd Transfer & Storage Co., D. Minn. Civil No.
1548, Dec. 5, 1945, Litigation Release No. 295, 308.
81. See SEC v. Mueller, E. D. Wis. Civil No. 2022, April 20, 1945,
Litigation Release No. 268.
82. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F Supp. 808, 818 n. 6 (D. l)el.
1951) , SEC v. Standard Oil Co. of Kansas, S. D. Tex., Civil No. 2552, Feh.
26, 1947, Litigation Release 388, SEC v. Greenfield, Civil No. 5361, April 2,
1946, Litigation Release No. 302, 333.
83. See e.g., SEC v. Mitchell, N. D. Ohio, Civil No. 23097. Aug. ',
1945, Litigation Release No. 288, 291.
84. See SEC v. Boyd Transfer & Storage Co., D. Minn., Civil No.
1548, Dec. 5, 1945, Litigation Release 295, 308.
85. Fifty-Third Union Trust Co. v. Block, 3 S. E. C. Jud. Dec. 1110
(S.D. Ohio 1946).
86. Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S. E. C. 373 (1946).
87 See SEC v. Cohen, E. D. Pa., Civil No. 5461, Dec. 11, 1945, Liti-
gation Release No. 311.
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A special problem which has caused some concern is whether a
purchaser violates X-1OB-5 by merely concealing his identity. Al-
though there has been no case where non-disclosure of the pur-
chaser's identity has been the sole deciding factor, the Commission
has ruled in a number of instances that the purchaser's name is one
of many material facts which must be disclosed., Therefore it
would seem that in any fairly large offer to purchase, concealmerit
of identity would be an invitation to SEC investigation of all aspects
of the transaction. In view of the fact that sellers often base their
judgments on what actions insiders take, the purchaser's identity
in nearly every case would be material and should therefore be
disclosed.
A company cannot necessarily defend against charges of non-
disclosure in purchases by showing that shareholders were fur-
nished with as much information as is customarily furnished by
other companies in the industry " If the welfare of the company
demands that information be kept confidential, the officers and
directors should be precluded from dealing in the company's shares
where disclosure is required. Further, delayed full disclosure should
not be a good defense if, at the time of disclosure, the seller's plans
could not be changed or withdrawn.0
It should be noted that "disclosure of material facts" does not
mean disclosure of opinion or other similar reasons for buying.
The SEC has attempted only to prevent the insider from cashing
in on a sure thing. Just because an insider acts with superior fore-
sight is no reason to rescind a transaction.
REMEDIES
The Commission, under § 21 of the Exchange Act,9' has power
to investigate, when it deems necessary, suspected violations of the
Act and is authorized to transmit evidence of such violations to the
Attorney General for criminal proceedings.02 Likewise, under §
88. Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S. E. C. 373. 380 (1946) ; SEC v.
Greenfield, E. D. Pa., Civil No. 5361, April 2, 1946, Litigation Release 302,
333.
89. Tis argument was made in SEC v. Standard Oil Co. of Kansas,
S. D. Tex., Civil No. 2552, Feb. 26, 1947, Litigation Release 388.
90. See Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F 2d 799 (3d Cir.
1949). A mutual insurance company set up a plan to convert into a stock
company. Its chief agent secured assignments of pre-emptive rights thereby
defeating company's plan for wide distribution of stock. The agent disclosed
just before the plan was to go into effect The majority held there mas full
disclosure but the dissent felt that the agent had violated X-10B-5 since the
company could not, at the time of disclosure, have withdrawn the plan.
91. 48 Stat 899 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 78 u (a) (1952).
92. 48 Stat 900 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 78 u (e) (1952).
1955]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
21 (e), 9 3 the SEC can enjoin violations of the Act or rules promul-
gated under it.
In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,0 4 a federal district court
granted to a complainant a civil cause of action for violation of
X-10B-5, even though § 10(b) had no express provision for civil
liability The court based its decision on the common law ground
that the violation of a statute makes the actor liable for the inva-
sion of another's interest if the injured party was one of a class
intended to be protected by the statute and the harm suffered was
one which the statute was designed to prevent.-3 The Kardon doc-
trine has been widely followed ;" under it a plaintiff is entitled to
damages or such equitable remedies as recission,0 accounting,"'
or the prosecution of a derivative suit on the corporation's behalf."
While one court has held that a private complainant has no right
to an injunction for repeated violations of X-10B-5,10 another has
indicated that a plaintiff can enjoin the violation of the Commission's
proxy rules, 01 and it would seem that once a plaintiff has established
a right to redress, he should be allowed to enjoin violations of the
Act where normal equitable grounds for an injunction exist.t ° '
TIMiE WITHIN WHICH SUIT MUST BE BROUGiiT
Section 10(b), which creates the right of action, contains no
statute of limitations. There is, furthermore, no general federal
statute of limitations applicable to a federally created cause of ac-
tion." 3 Under such circumstances the United States Supreme Court
93. Ibid.
94. 69 F Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1947)
95. The court also reasoned that § 29 (b) of the Exchange Act which
provides that contracts in violation of the Act shall be void implies a civil
remedy since § 29 "would be of little value unless a party to the contract could
apply to the courts to relieve himself of obligations under it." Id. at 514.
96. E.g., Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F 2d 627 (2d Cir. 1953)
97 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F Supp. 798, 802 (E.D. Pa.
1947) (dictum). In a recent case the SEC as amicus curiae argued that the
inclusion of non-securities (land) as well as securities in an action wluch
would otherwise come under X-10B-5 should not bar recission under the
Rule. The Commission contended that to hold otherwise would create a simple
way of frustrating the Rule. See Brief for the SEC as amicus curiae pp.
10-11, Cornell v. Errion, W D. Wash., Civil No. 3556, Jan. 1954. The motioi
to dismiss was denied. See Loss, Securities Regulations 1955 Supplement 373
(1955)
98. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947)
99. Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F 2d 799. 805-806 (3d
Cir. 1949) (dictum)
100. Goldsmith v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 3 S. H. C. Jud.
Dec. 1848 (N.D. Ohio 1948).
101. Phillips v. United Corp., 3 S. E. C. Jud. Dec. 1483, 1493-95 (S.D.
N.Y. 1947) (dictum).
102. See Loss. o/t cit. supra note 2, at 1006 (1951)
103. See Note, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 68 (1953)
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has held that where the action is legal'0 4 or, though equitable, is
concurrent with a legal remedy, the state statute of limitations
must apply1 0 5 But when a complainant is seeking only an equitable
remedy under a federally created substantive right, the federal
doctrine of laches applies. 06 Since in most cases actions under
X-10B-5 will be for money damages, a legal remedy, the courts will
look to the state statutes of limitations.1 0 7 Presumably, however, a
purely equitable action under the Rule would be governed by laches.
Thus far the X-10B-5 cases holding on the question have applied
the law of fhe state in which the court sits.108
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
-Rule X-10B-5 has tremendous potential as a remedy for sellers
defrauded by non-disclosure. By imposing on buyers a duty to dis-
close all material facts, the Rule, at least in some jurisdictions,
liberalizes the traditional common law doctrine of disclosure. And
since X-10B-5 is drawn to include "any person," the scope of dis-
closure requirements may be extended to embrace persons other
than those covered at common law. Probably the Rule has been most
effectively used in preventing a corporation from purchasing its
own securities without full disclosure. The SEC has required cor-
porations .to comply as strictly as individuals with rules of dis-
closure. Moreover, it is not necessary for a plaintiff to sell directly
to the defendant m order to be protected by the Rule, so long as the
sale was induced by him, although it is questionable whether mere
reliance on an undervalued market price created by the defendant
would be sufficient to hold him for non-disclosure.
The Rule's effectiveness is enhanced by the power of the SEC
to investigate and enjoin potential rule violations. This has the
advantage of being a strong deterrent, often preventing injury
which would have otherwise occurred. Also the availability of civil
104. Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U. S. 96 (1941).
105. . Cope v. Anderson, 331 U. S. 461 (1947).
106. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392 (1946).
107 See Note, 59 Yale L. J. 1120, 1132-1133 (1950).
108. Fischman v. Raytheon Alfg. Co., 188 F 2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951);
Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F Supp. 954 (N.D. Ill.
1952) ; Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. N.Y. 1949). Even after
deciding that a state statute of limitation will apply there is still the further
question of whether related problems must be settled according to state law.
e.g., when the limitation period commences. Compare the reasoning in Fratt
v. Robinson, 203 F 2d 627, 634-635 (9th Cir. 1953) (Circuit Court seemed
to make its own determination of which of two state statutes of limitations to
apply) with Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp.
954, 966-967 (N.D. Ill. 1952) (court looked to state law to determine which
of two state statutes of limitations to apply). See Note, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 68,
71-72 (1953).
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remedies to parties injured by the Rule's violation increases its
value and gives plaintiffs the Rules liberal grounds for relief. Fur-
thermore, the civil litigant gets the benefits of the venue, jurisdic-
tional, and process serving advantages of § 27 of the Act. 09 Suit
may be brought in any district where the defendant is found, or is
an inhabitant, or transacts business. Process can be served wherever
the defendant is an inhabitant or is found and the federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction of violations under the Act.
To determine what must be disclosed the courts look to whether
the fact would have materially influenced the seller's judgment.
While it is difficult to decide which facts taken by themselves are
material, it is clear that non-disclosure of any fact pointing to an
insider's attempt to profit unfairly should be considered a violation
of X-10B-5.
109. 48 Stat. 902 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 78 a a (1952)
